UK competition law collective proceedings regime evolving a decade on

Important amendments to the Competition Act 1998 (Competition Act), introduced by the Consumer Rights Act 2015, transformed consumers’ ability to seek redress for losses or damages, ushering in an opt-out collective actions regime for infringements of competition law.

Ten years on since the collective proceedings regime’s inception, there is still considerable debate about the direction of travel for the opt-out regime. As the UK government undertakes a review of the current regime, there are four notable cases before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) that look set to provide significant procedural clarity to different respects of the regime in 2026 and beyond.

Damages distribution - uptake by class members

The post-settlement conflict in Justin Gutmann v Stagecoach is a prime example. The case concerns allegations by Justin Gutmann, a retired researcher and public policy and consumer welfare specialist, that the rail franchise operator abused its dominance in failing to make so-called ‘boundary fares’ readily available to an estimated 1.4 million UK consumers holding travel cards.

The CAT approved a landmark settlement against the operator of up to £25m in May 2024, marking the first time consumers were in line to receive compensation under the collective actions regime since its inception.

However, only a reported £216,604 has so far been claimed by members of the represented class. Consequently, and pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, the settlement amount has been reduced to £10.2m. This prompted a stakeholder entitlement hearing in September 2025 regarding how the unclaimed damages should be distributed between the third-party litigation funders, Woodsford, and claimant solicitors, Charles Lyndon. The CAT had already held that £3.7m should be paid to the Access to Justice Foundation.

Business and consumer lobby group Fair Civil Justice was granted permission to intervene in this hearing, cautioning against the funders and solicitors being allocated a perverse incentive despite low take-up rates by the represented class. The judgment is reserved and, whatever the outcome, will provide much-needed clarity on entitlements and how unclaimed compensation should be distributed in future opt-out collective actions.

Damages award - payment to litigation funders

Another case to watch involves an opt-out claim filed, again by Gutmann, alleging an abuse of dominance by Apple in relation to its iPhone batteries and “throttling” of iPhone performance. While the concept of a ‘professional class representative’ in this manner has yet to be challenged on certification, it may be ripe for consideration.

The case – Justin Gutmann v Apple – was certified in November 2023, subject to the litigation funding agreement (LFA) being amended to take account of the Supreme Court’s ruling in the PACCAR case. The amended LFA contained terms which provided for payment of a return to the third-party litigation funder to be prioritised over any distribution of damages to members of the represented class.

In April 2025 the Court of Appeal upheld the CAT decision that the collective proceedings regime under the Competition Act permits priority payment in this manner, subject to the CAT’s supervisory jurisdiction. Apple appealed this decision to the Supreme Court in June.

The Supreme Court has recently refused permission to appeal. It therefore remains to be seen how the CAT will exercise its supervisory jurisdiction over funding in light of the Court of Appeal decision.

Multiple-based litigation funding agreements

The enforceability of multiple-based funding agreements is also being challenged by conjoined appeals brought by Visa, Mastercard and Apple. These claims concern the lawfulness of the wording within the respective LFAs, which were revised to express the funders’ returns as a multiple of their investments rather than as percentage of damages following the PACCAR judgment.

In July 2025, the Court of Appeal upheld these LFAs as enforceable, rejecting arguments that caps tied to damages converted them into unenforceable damages-based agreements. Visa and Apple applied in September to the Supreme Court for permission to appeal against the July judgment, making it unlikely that a hearing will take place before 2026.

If the Supreme Court sets aside the Court of Appeal’s judgment, this could prove to be the catalyst for the government to articulate its legislative position following the PACCAR case – particularly given the recommendations outlined in the Civil Justice Council’s (CJC) recent review that PACCAR should be reversed.

Expanding the boundaries of competition law claims

Another case, Liza Lovdahl Gormsen v Meta, which has data privacy underpinnings but has been brought as an abuse of dominance case, will be important to watch. In this instance Dr Gormsen, a legal academic, seeks to represent a class who she claims are entitled to damages as a result of what she alleges is an abuse of a dominant market position by Meta, the parent company behind Facebook.

The significance of this case is plain: the collective proceedings regime under the Competition Act is currently the only genuine opt-out regime in the UK and is exclusively available to competition claims. Notably, the decisions in Lloyd v Google and Prismall v DeepMind closed the doors to equivalent representative actions under Civil Procedure Rule 19.8, at least for data privacy claims. Prospective claimants are instead now seeking to characterise a range of claims as competition law infringements so they can be brought as collective proceedings before the CAT.

This is possible because the competition law concept of “abuse of dominance” is flexible and various novel cases have been pursued as abuse of dominance competition law infringements over the years by competition authorities across Europe. Indeed, the Gormsen v Meta litigation itself takes inspiration from a long-running competition law enforcement case conducted by the German competition authority which was upheld by the EU’s highest court. It is therefore not surprising that claimants are increasingly seeking to characterise data privacy, consumer protection, environmental pollution, or other behaviours as examples of abuse of dominance when bringing standalone opt-out collective proceedings before the CAT.

In one notable example, Professor Carolyn Roberts’ application (5 pages / 249KB) to raise a claim against six water companies was seen by many as an ESG matter, rather than a competition law claim. While the CAT declined to certify the case in March 2025, this was for specific reasons related to the Water Industry Act 1991. Indeed, the CAT indicated that it would have been minded to certify the collective actions for trial if this had not, in effect, been precluded by the regulatory regime in the water sector.

The CAT also recently declined to certify a case brought by Blur drummer Dave Rowntree against the Performing Rights Society and was more forthcoming in querying whether the performing rights royalties case entailed individual competition law claims.

Gormsen’s case against Meta has been certified and will proceed to trial in 2027. A judgment which considers the intersection between competition law and data privacy aspects of this case would be welcome.

Written with the assistance of Emilie Jones, Tadeusz Gielas and Gemma Erskine of Pinsent Masons.