Benefit-for-delay?
Patent settlement agreements which include a “pay-for-delay” element have been subject to investigations by the European Commission and national competition authorities. These arrangements have arisen in the context of small molecule generic medicines, where an originator company offers the competitor generic a payment or other benefit in return for the generic agreeing not to enter the market for an agreed period of time. Such arrangements have been viewed as anti-competitive.
The higher costs associated with the development of biosimilars, including the more complex regulatory pathway, along with the lack of interchangeability, may support the contention that there is less likely to be an immediate price erosion and loss of sales for the biologic, and therefore less of an incentive to pay biosimilars to stay off the market. This type of agreement may therefore be less likely in the biosimilar space, but nonetheless will likely raise competition issues if implemented.
However, ongoing litigation in the US in respect of Abbvie’s Humira branded product for the biologic adalimumab, goes one step further in terms of assessing what constitutes ‘value’ or a ‘benefit-for-delay’, rather than a payment. The core issue is whether an agreement in which biosimilars would receive early access to the European market in return for an agreement to stay out of the US market until a later date is considered anti-competitive. In other words, the biosimilar manufacturer does not receive a direct payment from the supplier of the biologic for the delay in entry for a particular market but will instead benefit indirectly by gaining early access in another valuable market. If the position was reversed and it had been EU market entry that had been delayed in return for early entry into the US, it is possible that an EU competition law regulator would also consider this type of agreement to be an illegal form of market sharing.
From a competition law perspective, it remains to be seen whether ‘benefit-for delay’ arrangements will be considered anti-competitive or simply part of doing business. While these issues have not yet been fully considered in the US, or at all in Europe, given the value of the biosimilars market they should be watched with interest.
Anti-competitive guidance?
Innovator companies are looking for ways to limit biosimilar market entrance, but such methods may also pose issues under competition law. Again, to date, such issues have only arisen in the US, where AbbVie has introduced a high-concentration version of Humira. This new version of the medicine is now capturing market share, which poses a problem for biosimilar manufacturers with approved adalimumab biosimilars in the original concentration that have launched or are yet to launch. Under current FDA guidance, such biosimilars would not be considered interchangeable with the higher concentration form of Humira, which causes an issue for biosimilar manufacturers. Boehringer Ingelheim has raised a red flag, arguing that this guidance therefore facilitates anti-competitive tactics, and has issued a Citizen’s Petition calling on the FDA to reinterpret its guidance.
In the generic space, the introduction of a new version of a drug prior to generic entry and tactics to force patients to switch product are known as “product hopping”. The conduct may be anti-competitive where the new version of the drug has limited or no patient benefit and, it is argued, was instead motivated by the originator as part of a strategy to avoid generic competition.
Given the challenges posed in reformulating biologics, such product hopping claims seem less likely to gain traction in biosimilar markets. It may therefore be the case that the relationship between biologic and biosimilar companies cannot be viewed as equivalent to that of small molecule originators and generic manufacturers, and that different competition issues arise. Given the rapid expansion of the biosimilars market, however, we expect such issues to be given consideration in the coming years.
Unified Patent Court
Patent litigation in Europe is expected to evolve in the years ahead. The proposed Unified Patent Court (UPC) may provide biosimilar manufacturers with a more cost-effective way to challenge secondary patent protection.
At present, infringement and validity of European patents is assessed by national courts. Validity can also be challenged at the European Patent Office in parallel for European patents, but this process is lengthy and therefore national proceedings may provide commercial certainty at any earlier time point. While national litigation in Europe is well-established and robust, it inevitably leads to litigation in multiple countries in parallel, particularly in respect of high value products such as pharmaceuticals, which can be expensive and risks divergent decisions in different jurisdictions. In Europe, the proposed unitary patent (UP), and UPC aims to address these issues by creating a specialised single patent court with exclusive jurisdiction for litigation relating to UPs and European patents, though holders of European patents can opt those patents out of the jurisdiction of the UPC.