The application for recognition was unopposed and the High Court considered recognition to be appropriate in the circumstances. The focus for the court concerned the disclosure of certain documents sought by Despins from Harcus Parker, a law firm jointly engaged by Kwok, ADHL and DSL in the proceedings brought against UBS.
Despins sought disclosure on the basis that Kwok’s interest in the UBS proceedings vested in him as trustee in bankruptcy. The order was sought under Articles 21(1)(d) and (g) of the UNCITRAL Model Law which provides that the court may grant relief to a foreign representative in recognised foreign main proceedings, including relief that may be available to a British insolvency officeholder.
The court found that relief under the UNCITRAL Model Law may extend to orders made by the court that enforce a trustee in bankruptcy’s investigatory powers under sections 311, 312 and 366 of the IA86 respectively, and that it had a discretionary power in the context of recognised foreign proceedings to make orders under those sections.
The discretion is to be exercised where it is “necessary” to protect the assets of the debtor or the interest of the creditors. Despins expressed the view that access to the privileged material was necessary so that he could consider the nature and merits of the claim against UBS before determining whether it was in his interests to pursue it.
The court confirmed that the joint engagement between Kwok, ADHL and DSL meant that each party had a joint interest in the privileged material. ADHL contended that it should be entitled to assert privilege against Despins. Whilst the court accepted that Despins did not enjoy the same rights as Kwok in relation to the privileged material, it found that ADHL and DSL’s right to assert privilege is one they share with Kwok as joint clients. It considered that the companies cannot assert privilege against Kwok to prevent him from having possession or control of the privileged material.
As a result, the court determined that the privileged material was within Kwok’s control or possession and within the scope of sections 311 and 366 of the IA86. ADHL and DSL, therefore, could not assert privilege to resist an application under section 311 of the IA86.
The court was satisfied that the UBS litigation represented a substantial asset for the benefit of Kwok’s creditors. Expecting Despins to participate in the litigation without full knowledge of the underlying facts could have exposed the bankruptcy estate to a significant adverse costs order. On that basis, the court confirmed it was necessary for Harcus Parker to provide the documents to Despins. Although Despins was entitled to inspect the documents for the purpose of assessing the nature and merits of the UBS litigation, he did not obtain the privilege and could not use the privileged material in a manner which would waive the privilege held by Kwok, ADHL and DSL even if it would benefit the bankrupt’s estate.
Gemma Kaplan of Pinsent Masons said: “It has been six years since the cases of Re Shlosberg and Leeds v Lemos where a large amount of attention was focussed by the courts and the insolvency profession as to a bankrupt’s right to assert privilege against a trustee in bankruptcy. Surprisingly, though, there have been few reported cases on the issue until now. The difference with the Kwok case is that the court additionally had to consider the interaction between the principles of joint privilege and a trustee’s right to obtain documents under the IA86.”
“Any officeholder in a similar position should ensure suitable safeguards are in place to make sure the privilege in the material being disclosed is not lost and to avoid criticism or potential applications against them for loss of privilege,” she said.
Bill Geiringer of Pinsent Masons said: “Instructing solicitors on a joint retainer where several clients’ interests are aligned is commonplace in litigation. However, such clients should be aware that the bankruptcy of one client could have consequences for disclosure of privileged material.”
“It is well established that where a law firm represents several clients on a joint retainer, each client has a joint interest in privileged material. This decision clarifies that a client cannot then assert that privilege against a co-client to prevent disclosure to a trustee in bankruptcy of the co-client. The impact of the judgment is significant for anyone instructing representatives on a joint retainer; they must be aware that the privilege may not provide protection if one of the joint clients becomes bankrupt and the trustee is collating books and records,” he said.
Co-authored by Nick Gilvear of Pinsent Masons.