In putting forward other recommendations for reform, the Law Commission cited input it had received to its consultations from Pinsent Masons – including in relation to section 67 of the Arbitration Act.
Section 67 allows a party to arbitral proceedings to challenge an award of a tribunal seated in England and Wales as to its ‘substantive jurisdiction’, or seek a declaration that an award on the merits of a dispute has no effect on the grounds that the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction. At present, the position following the Supreme Court’s decision in Dallah v Government of Pakistan is that a section 67 challenge involves a full re-hearing by the court of the jurisdictional objections, which can include a re-examination of the facts – regardless of the tribunal’s findings and irrespective of the arguments which were advanced by the parties in the arbitration.
The Law Commission initially considered that challenges raised under section 67 should be limited to an appeal rather than a full rehearing, but its position “evolved” after Pinsent Masons and others advised that there was good reason not to restrict the ability of the court to re-hear the evidence and arguments in section 67 cases.
In its Bill, the Law Commission has proposed that the courts should be allowed to make rules which allow for new grounds of objection and evidence that were not previously raised before the tribunal to be raised in a section 67 challenge only if the ground or evidence were not known or could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence. These rules would also provide that evidence previously before the tribunal could not be re-heard by the court unless it considers it necessary in the interests of justice.
In relation to section 67 cases, Pinsent Masons had also urged the Law Commission to expand the type of remedies available to the courts to include an option for the courts to remit the award to the tribunal – a suggestion the Law Commission has adopted in its recommendations, citing its potential relevance in cases where, for example, the tribunal had wrongly held that it had no jurisdiction, or where the award is set aside in part.
The Law Commission also advocated changes to the Arbitration Act to provide explicitly that an arbitral tribunal is able to make an award of costs in cases where the tribunal itself has ruled that it has no jurisdiction to rule on the dispute at issue. The Law Commission said: “If … costs are not recoverable, we thought that position unattractive in principle. It would allow a party who wrongly initiated arbitral proceedings to walk away free of consequences, in circumstances where it had triggered the costs of bringing arbitration proceedings in the first place and progressing them to the point of their dismissal. That seems unfair.”
Pinsent Masons’ proposal that the question of costs should be remitted back to the tribunal where the court determines that the tribunal had no jurisdiction was also adopted by the Law Commission, which noted that in circumstances where the court may not have the power to award the costs of the arbitral proceedings, the losing party should not be permitted to avoid said costs simply because the arbitration had been ended by the court’s ruling on jurisdiction rather than the tribunal’s.
Pinsent Masons’ input in relation to other aspects of reform that the Law Commission considered also appears to have been persuasive. For example, the Law Commission endorsed Pinsent Masons’ call to make express provision in the Act confirming that arbitral tribunals have the power to dispose of cases that have no real prospect of success faster, by means of a summary procedure.