OUT-LAW GUIDE 2 min. read
How ‘time at large’ applies under Qatari and Saudi law
09 Feb 2026, 11:19 am
‘Time at large’ is a construction law principle which refers to the situation where the contractual date for completion of the works is no longer enforceable, meaning the contractor is no longer bound to finish the works by the date stated in the contract.
Instead, the contractor’s obligation becomes to complete the works within a reasonable time. When time is ‘at large’, the absence of a specific completion date in the contract means that the provisions on liquidated damages usually become unworkable and therefore unenforceable.
While ‘time at large’ is a common law principle, its effect has been enshrined to an extent within Qatari law. It arises where a completion date is unenforceable, the contract is silent or ambiguous and the law imposes a duty to complete within a reasonable time.
Under Article 687(1) of Qatar’s Civil Code, a contractor “must perform the work in accordance with the conditions recorded in the contracting contract and within the period agreed upon”. However, where the contract has no conditions, or no period has been agreed, Article 687 provides that the contractor “must perform the work in accordance with recognised principles and within a reasonable period required by the nature of the work while observing the custom of the trade”.
A similar approach appears in the Saudi Civil Transaction Law at Article 465 which provides that the “contractor shall complete the work in accordance with the terms of the contract and within the agreed-upon period.” It goes on to say that, where the contract does not include specific terms or no period has been agreed, “the contractor shall complete the work in accordance with the prevailing standards and within a reasonable period as required by the nature of the work.”
Most construction contracts do contain a completion date, and a mechanism for extending the time for completion. However, if the employer prevents the contractor from completing, or fails or refuses to operate the contractual extension of time machinery correctly or at all, it may be possible for the contractor to argue that they are no longer bound by the original completion date and that “no period has been agreed” such that, pursuant to Article 687(1) (in Qatar) or Article 465 (in Saudi), time is at large.
This brings us to another common law construction concept: the prevention principle. This principle provides that, in a construction context, an employer cannot hold a contractor to a completion date if the employer has prevented the contractor from achieving that date. Put simply; an employer cannot benefit from their own wrongdoing.
There is support for this in Middle Eastern jurisprudence. Egyptian scholar Abd el-Razzak el-Sanhuri comments that, where an employer introduces changes to a project which had not been previously agreed upon and which will cause a delay to the time for completion, the contractor is not liable for the delay as long as those changes are completed within a reasonable timeframe.
Qatari law adopts the same principle through its general doctrines of good faith and equity - Article 172.1 of the Qatar Civil Code - and the well-established principle that a party cannot benefit from its own wrongdoing. If an employer’s acts or omissions – such as late instructions, variations, or failure to provide access – delay the contractor, the employer cannot then insist on strict compliance with the original completion date and levy liquidated damages for failure to achieve the same.
A failure or refusal to operate the extension of time mechanism, in circumstances where an extension is due to the contractor, will also be a breach of contract and the obligations to perform contractual obligations in good faith, which is compensable pursuant to Articles 256 and 263 of the Qatar Civil Code.
Taking the above into account, it can sometimes be arguable that a deliberate refusal to operate an extension of time mechanism relieves the contractor from an obligation to achieve the completion date, and therefore that as “no period has been agreed” for the purpose of Article 687(1), time is “at large”.
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