DIFC judgment confirms scope of interim relief

In its judgment in Mr Oran, Oaken v Oved, the court observed that just because the DIFC court has the power to grant a freezing injunction to support a foreign court’s proceedings, there must still be a jurisdictional basis for doing so.

The court determined that the jurisdictional basis cannot simply be “supporting of foreign proceedings” since there is no such freestanding jurisdictional ground. Instead, the jurisdictional basis in such cases is based on the “enforcement principle”. This means the court has jurisdiction – in addition to the power – to grant a freezing order in support of foreign proceedings where such an order would support the potential future enforcement of the foreign judgment in the DIFC.

Similarly, a jurisdictional basis is required for the DIFC court to issue an anti-suit injunction in support of an arbitral process. An example of such a basis would be where the arbitration agreement provides for the arbitration to be seated in the DIFC. It is not sufficient to merely ask the court to issue an anti-suit injunction against a party to support any foreign arbitration, solely on the basis that the court has, in theory, the power in its armoury to issue such relief.

This both reinforces and clarifies the DIFC Court of Appeal’s landmark 2025 decision in Carmon Reestrutura v Cuenda, in which the court adopted an expansive approach and confirmed that the DIFC courts have broad jurisdiction to issue worldwide freezing orders in aid of foreign proceedings. That the court has such a power is not questioned. However, the Oran case clarifies that this power is not in and of itself a source of the court having jurisdiction to issue such an order. In the case of a freezing order, that jurisdiction is based on the enforcement principle.

The court’s approach suggests that freezing orders may be granted even where the DIFC courts lack jurisdiction over the underlying substantive dispute, provided that the court does have – or will have – an interest in facilitating enforcement of the resulting foreign judgment. It remains to be seen what the potential parameters of the “potential future enforcement” nexus might be and whether enforcement against an insolvent DIFC entity which is known to have nil value would be sufficient for a freezing order. In practice this issue is likely to resolve itself, as parties are unlikely to seek such relief where there is no value in doing so.

The case also raises the question as to whether the enforcement principle extends to entities domiciled in the DIFC, but whose assets are held in foreign jurisdictions. Given the personal obligations created by a freezing order – and a breach of any order being against an entity subject to the DIFC court’s contempt jurisdiction – it seems likely that this would fall within the enforcement principle, even if the assets themselves are located elsewhere.

In this case, Oved, as the respondent, argued that this decision marked a change in the law in essence because there is no ‘carte blanche’ for the court to issue freezing orders in support of foreign proceedings. It was argued that this ought to reduce the recoverable costs. However, the court rejected this view on the basis that there was no departure from prior authority. The court reiterated the principle articulated in the Carmon case that the purpose of interim relief in support of foreign proceedings is to avoid thwarting the court’s express jurisdiction to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment, a power which is expressly recognised in article 31 of Dubai Law No. 2 of 2025.

While the Carmon case was widely viewed as enhancing the DIFC’s position as a leading centre for international asset recovery, in the Oran case the court reasserted an important qualification: the DIFC courts’ jurisdiction to grant interim relief in aid of foreign proceedings is not a “freestanding jurisdiction to grant injunctions of any kind against any person.” A nexus to the DIFC, specifically, the protection of the court’s existing or anticipated enforcement jurisdiction, remains essential.

Commenting on the ruling, Damian Crosse, a disputes expert at Pinsent Masons, said: “Whilst practitioners in this jurisdiction do like to see an expansive approach to the function and scope of what the DIFC court is empowered to do, it remains to be seen in future cases what the particular requirements of the enforcement principle are.

Sammy Nanneh, a Dubai-based litigation expert of Pinsent Masons, said the case made clear that the protection of the court’s existing or anticipated enforcement jurisdiction remains essential. “This is a clear decision from the Court of Appeal, but it remains to be seen what exactly a nexus to the DIFC requires for the purposes of satisfying the enforcement principle, including in cases where assets are located in the UAE more widely than the DIFC.