The DIFC and ADGM courts provide one of the most expansive interim remedy frameworks available to parties engaged in foreign litigation and arbitration, including prohibitory and mandatory injunctions, worldwide freezing orders, search and preservation orders, interim payments, security for costs, asset disclosure, and orders preserving evidence or property. These remedies operate as enforcement infrastructure rather than mere procedural stop‑gaps.
Interim relief obtained in support of foreign proceedings is often decisive in preserving enforcement value. Freezing orders, disclosure orders and preservation measures prevent the dissipation or concealment of assets during extended foreign proceedings and the subsequent recognition phase.
By doing so, they effectively “lock in” asset location and control, reduce later disputes over ownership and jurisdiction, and frequently apply sufficient commercial pressure to drive early resolution. Properly deployed, interim measures shift enforcement from a reactive asset chase into a controlled execution exercise, materially increasing the prospects of recovery.
The DIFC courts’ jurisdiction to grant interim measures in support of foreign proceedings is wide but enforcement‑anchored. The courts have confirmed that relief is available where the underlying foreign proceedings could realistically produce a judgment or award capable of recognition and enforcement in the DIFC.
That limitation was illustrated in one recent case heard in the DIFC courts where the applicants sought interim injunctive relief in support of ongoing arbitration proceedings in Milan. The DIFC court refused interim relief because the arbitration sought declaratory and corporate governance remedies that “would not give rise to any potential for enforcement in the DIFC” and “could not yield a judgment which could be enforced in the DIFC”.
As a matter of jurisdiction, the application therefore fell outside article 15(4) of the Dubai Court Law, which expressly provides that the DIFC courts have the power to grant interim relief within the DIFC in support of foreign litigation or foreign arbitration proceedings taking place outside of the DIFC’s territory.
The enforcement‑protective rationale underpinning the jurisdiction was clearly articulated in the Trafigura case, where the DIFC court confirmed: “Whatever the full scope of the jurisdiction, it encompasses interim measures taken out in the DIFC in aid of proceedings which could yield a judgment recognised and enforced in the DIFC.
This includes interim measures such as freezing orders which would prevent the enforcement procedures of the DIFC in relation to foreign judgments from being thwarted.”
That same jurisdiction extends to disclosure and information‑gathering orders relevant not only to the conduct of the foreign proceedings, but also to future enforcement.
A distinctive feature of the DIFC regime is its treatment of arbitral interim measures. Under article 42 of the DIFC Arbitration Law, the DIFC courts may recognise and enforce interim measures or provisional awards ordered by arbitral tribunals even where the seat of the arbitration is outside the DIFC, as confirmed in cases including the 2023 case Muhallam v Muhaf and Neal v Nadir in 2024.
This approach goes further than the New York Convention or the UNCITRAL Model Law, reflecting a deliberate policy choice to give arbitral interim relief practical teeth at the enforcement stage. Where the seat of arbitration is the DIFC, article 24(2) of the DIFC Arbitration Law allows direct enforcement of interim measures without a recognition step, with the court merely “giving force” to the tribunal’s decision and not reassessing enforcement policy.
The ADGM courts adopt a similarly robust, enforcement‑driven approach. Under section 41 of the 2015 Regulations, worldwide freezing orders are firmly within the court’s powers, as confirmed by Sir Andrew Smith in A17 v B17 and later reaffirmed in Sky Property Holdings Ltd v Corporate Sky Business Center Ltd.
The breadth of the ADGM courts’ discretion is further illustrated in the 2025 case A30 & Ors v E30 & Ors, where a worldwide freezing order was granted even though the applicant had not initially sought the arbitral tribunal’s permission under the applicable institutional rules, on the basis that doing so would “defeat the purpose” of the relief by alerting the respondent. The emphasis throughout is effectiveness, not procedural formalism.
Co-written by Suzan Shaban of Pinsent Masons.