A cyber attack that reportedly caused fires and widespread food spoilage at hundreds of French supermarkets has highlighted cyber security of connected building systems as an emerging challenge for Australia's construction and property sectors.
Buildings are becoming increasingly dependent on internet-connected technologies to manage functions such as heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), security, lighting, lifts and energy management. As a result, any interruptions to these can also affect the physical operation of buildings and critical infrastructure.
For Australian developers, contractors, asset owners and building managers, the incident is a reminder that cyber security risks can emerge throughout a building's lifecycle, from design and procurement through to operation and maintenance.
The incident occurred in October, when threat actors reportedly gained access to internet-connected refrigeration systems used by several French supermarket chains. Temperatures were allegedly raised to as high as 50C, causing fires and destroying refrigerated food stocks.
Reports suggest around more than 350 stores were affected. The incident attracted attention not only because of its scale, but because attackers allegedly interfered with the operation of physical equipment rather than just stealing data.
The fact multiple competing supermarket chains were affected has also prompted suggestions that the compromise may have involved a shared supplier, refrigeration management platform or category of connected equipment rather than a vulnerability unique to one retailer.
For Australian organisations, the incident illustrates how cyber attacks against operational technology (OT) systems can create real-world operational, safety and financial consequences.
Connected technologies are now embedded throughout Australia's built environment. Building management systems, HVAC controls, security cameras, lighting systems, lifts, access controls, energy management platforms and fire safety systems increasingly rely on network connectivity and remote access.
While these technologies can improve building performance and efficiency, they also expand the number of pathways through which attackers may gain access to critical systems. This is particularly relevant for OT systems, which monitor and control physical devices and infrastructure. Historically, many OT environments operated in relative isolation, but they are now often connected to business networks, cloud-based management platforms, maintenance providers and other external services.
The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) has repeatedly warned that insecure connectivity can create opportunities for malicious actors to disrupt essential services and critical infrastructure. As a result, cyber security risks are increasingly moving beyond just being technology risks and now encompass construction, operational and asset management risks too.
Cyber security starts long before a building is occupied
The French incident highlights why cyber security must be a consideration during the earliest stages of a project and not just after a building becomes operational.
Decisions made during design and procurement can have long-term implications for a building's cyber resilience. Once systems are selected and integrated, factors such as authentication controls, remote-access capabilities and ongoing security support may be difficult and costly to change.
Not all connected devices present the same risk. An occupancy sensor may require different controls from a building management system that controls HVAC, electrical infrastructure or physical access. Where a compromise could affect safety, operations or business continuity, stronger security requirements may be appropriate.
The ASD's OT security guidance emphasises the importance of identifying critical systems, understanding system dependencies and limiting unnecessary connectivity between OT and external-facing networks.
Supply chain and contractual risks cannot be ignored
Cyber risks in modern buildings often involve multiple organisations.
Developers, head contractors, subcontractors, maintenance providers and facilities managers may all play a role in selecting, configuring or managing connected systems. In some cases, vendors continue to retain remote access to building systems long after practical completion.
This creates potential uncertainty around who is responsible for applying security updates, managing vulnerabilities, monitoring access and responding to incidents.
Construction contracts and downstream supply agreements should therefore clearly address cyber security responsibilities, including requirements relating to patching, remote access, incident notification, vulnerability management and ongoing support.
The French attack also demonstrates the potential consequences of supply chain vulnerabilities where a common technology provider, platform or equipment type creates a shared point of risk across multiple organisations.
Handover should include cyber security
Cyber security should also form part of commissioning and handover processes. When building owners assume responsibility for operating a new asset, they should have a clear understanding of the connected systems installed throughout the building, including associated hardware, software and firmware.
They should also understand how those systems interact, which third parties retain access, what support arrangements are in place and whether any known vulnerabilities remain outstanding. Without visibility, owners may inherit cyber risks they do not fully understand.
Importantly, cyber security obligations are not over once a project is complete. Connected assets continue to evolve throughout a building's operational life. New devices can be added, facilities managers may change and software that was secure when installed may eventually become unsupported.
Maintaining an accurate view of connected systems and managing changes over time therefore becomes a critical part of asset management.
SOCI obligations raise the stakes for critical infrastructure
The issues become even more significant where a building forms part of, or supports, an asset regulated under Australia's Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI Act).
The SOCI Act imposes a range of obligations on responsible entities, including cyber incident reporting requirements and, for certain organisations, the implementation and maintenance of a critical infrastructure risk management program (CIRMP).
While these obligations generally sit with the responsible entity, compliance often depends on the actions of contractors, suppliers and technology providers involved in designing, installing or maintaining the systems supporting that asset.
For example, after a cyber incident, a responsible entity may need assistance from third parties to identify affected systems, obtain logs, remove access, apply security patches or support regulatory reporting obligations.
As a result, organisations involved in the delivery and operation of critical infrastructure projects should ensure contractual arrangements provide access to the information and cooperation needed to manage cyber risks and meet regulatory requirements.
The French supermarket attack is a reminder that cyber security failures can have physical consequences. For Australia's construction and property sectors, the lesson is not simply that connected technologies create new cyber risks, but that those risks must be managed throughout the lifecycle of an asset.
As smart building technologies become more widespread and operational systems become increasingly connected, cyber security is becoming a core consideration alongside safety, functionality and physical design.
For developers, contractors, owners and operators, that means addressing cyber risk from procurement and construction through to handover, maintenance and long-term operation.
Co-written by Amy Atkinson of Pinsent Masons.