Fraud generally requires the contractor to show that the calling party – i.e. the employer – called on the guarantee either with the knowledge that its demand was invalid; without belief in the validity of its demand; or with indifference to whether the demand was valid or not.
On the other hand, unconscionability denotes elements of unfairness, reprehensible conduct or acts lacking in good faith such that the court would restrain the employer from calling on the guarantee. Courts in Singapore and Australia have both developed different standards for a contractor seeking to establish that a call on a guarantee is unconscionable, while the exception is considerably less established in the UK. By way of illustration, the Singapore High Court recently provided some examples for when an injunction might be granted to restrain the call of a performance bond for unconscionability:
- calls for excessive sums;
- calls based on contractual breaches that the beneficiary of the call itself is responsible for;
- calls tainted by ‘unclean hands’ e.g. supported by inflated estimates of damages or based on incomplete disclosures;
- calls made for ulterior motives; and
- calls based on a position which is inconsistent with the stance that the beneficiary took prior to calling on the performance bond.
There are therefore limited scenarios in which a contractor may invoke the “unconscionability exception” to prevent a call on an on-demand bank guarantee. To compound matters, the Singapore Court of Appeal has stated that parties can contract out of the unconscionability exception, which, depending on the parties’ relative negotiating power, may make it even more difficult for contractors to restrain an impending bond call.
The challenges faced by contractors in preventing a call on an on-demand performance bond are therefore considerable.
Applying for interim measures under the ICC Rules
Instead of seeking court intervention, GE and Mytilineos followed a different path. They applied to the ICC tribunal under Article 28 of the ICC Rules for interim measures to restrain the call on the guarantees made by SPE. Article 28 provides that, once the arbitration is transferred to the arbitral tribunal, it can “order any interim or conservatory measures that [the arbitral tribunal] deems appropriate”.
The tribunal granted the contractors an order that SPE withdraw its request for the enforcement of the bank guarantees. In doing so, it referred specifically to its jurisdiction under Article 28, as well as referring to the general recognition of a tribunal’s jurisdiction to order interim measures in many national codes of civil procedure and other arbitral rules. The tribunal’s reasoning to make the order for the withdrawal of SPE’s call was two-fold:
- maintaining the status quo during the arbitral proceedings is essential and measures may be ordered to avoid aggravation of the dispute;
- it was contrary to the duty of loyalty in arbitration law for SPE to seek to coerce GE and Mytilineos to withdraw from the arbitration.
Whilst the behaviour of SPE was the type that would likely meet the test of “unconscionability” under, say, Singapore law, it is apparent that the tribunal reached beyond domestic legal principles of fraud, unconscionability and abuse of process. Article 28 provided the tribunal with the jurisdiction to consider all the circumstances to determine what was appropriate in the circumstances. This included the principle of maintaining the status quo in the arbitration, pending the final resolution of the substantive disputes.
The outcome in this case suggests it may be easier for contractors to prevent a call on an on-demand bank guarantee in arbitration than to argue before the courts that intervention is justified under the conventional exceptions of fraud and unconscionability. Whether this would succeed will in turn depend on the underlying contract having an arbitration clause in it and on the arbitral rules agreed.
In the case of GE and Mytilineos, the substantive arbitration was already commenced, and the tribunal constituted. Where there is a more urgent need and the tribunal is not yet constituted, the appointment of an emergency arbitrator under Article 29 of the ICC Rules can open up the potential to obtain urgent interim measures.
Although the ICC tribunal in this case did not employ an analysis through the lens of unconscionability, their description of the actions taken by SAPE as “abusive” and “serious” certainly appears to fit within the ambit of what some common law jurisdictions consider to be unconscionable behaviour. This case may provide useful precedent for contractors seeking to restrain a call on performance bonds.
Co-written by Horace Ng of Pinsent Masons.